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COMMENTS
THE ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCY OF
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal law jurisprudence offers several rationales for imposing
punishments upon criminal offenders, but only one of these rationales,
deterrence, is applicable to such economic entities as corporations. This
comment employs economic efficiency as a gauge to analyze the effec-
tiveness of imposing criminal sanctions to deter socially undesirable con-
duct. The comment examines different classes of legal rules to
determine whether a private individual or the public (i.e. the govern-
ment) should enforce each class of rules and, if the public should enforce
a class, whether criminal or civil sanctions against violators maximizes
economic efficiency and deterrence effectiveness.
The comment concludes that for the class of corporate legal rules
with a probability close to one (or unity) that the victims will detect a
breach, the victims should privately enforce the rules. Where the
probability that the victims will detect a breach is not close to unity,
public enforcement of these legal rules with civil sanctions will maxi-
mize economic efficiency. Civil sanctions are preferrable for corporate
breaches of all legal rules because criminal sanctions increase the costs of
enforcing legal rules without producing a concomitant benefit to society
and thus are less efficient.
Regardless of whether a legal rule is one that should be privately or
publicly enforced, the expected cost to a corporate offender from in-
flicting social damage should equal the social damage that the corporate
offense imposes. When an offender's expected cost from committing an
offense equals the offense's social cost, the liability system encourages
value- or welfare-maximizing corporate behavior, maximizing society's
net wealth.
II. CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CORPORATION
At different times, criminal law jurisprudence has advanced one or
more of five rationales to justify criminal punishment: restraint, rehabil-
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itation, deterrence, education and retribution.1 Debate among propo-
nents of these rationales has led to a general acceptance of two inclusive
theories of criminal sanctions-the consequentialist and retributive
theories.2
The first four rationales are conceptually distinct from the fifth and
together form the consequentialist theory of criminal punishment: pun-
ishment is a means to obtain socially desirable consequences. 3 Re-
straining, deterring, rehabilitating and educating criminal offenders all
benefit society by reducing the number of crimes and offenders. Accord-
ing to consequentialist punishment theory, a future-oriented theory, so-
ciety should impose criminal sanctions solely to reduce the level of
future crime.
In contrast, retributive theory of criminal law regards punishment
as the proper response to offenders' acts of moral culpability or blame-
worthiness.4 Retributive theory is past- or act-oriented: society should
impose sanctions on those who have violated its legal rules solely be-
cause of offenders' past acts of immorality, including the act of breaking
the law.5 In a situation where a criminal offender, is filled with such
compunction that reform is certain, a retributivist would still punish the
offender because of his moral blameworthiness; 6 a consequentialist
would view the punishment as unnecessary and wasteful. 7
Retributive theory generally requires some form of mens rea, or
guilty mind, before society is justified in imposing criminal sanctions
because moral culpability-the touchstone of the theory-requires an
actor's knowledge of his past actions.8 Consequentialist theory does not
impose a requirement of mens tea because the concept is generally irrele-
vant to the sanction's purpose, which is to reduce future crime.9
1 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (proposed Official Draft, 1962); W. LAFAvE & A.
ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAw § 5 (1972); H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCION
35-61 (1968).
2 See W. LAFAVE &A. ScoTr, supra note 1, at 21-25; H. PACKER, s.upra note 1, at 10-16;
Developiments in the Law-Cororate Crime.. Regulating Corpiorate Behavior Through Criminal Sanc-
lions, 92 HAmv. L. REv. 1227, 1231-33 (1979).
3 See H. PACKER, supira note 1, at 11; Developmentr in the Law-Coriorate Crime, supira note 2,
at 1231-43.
4 See I. KANT, THE M-TAPHYSICAL ELEME rs OF JUSTICE 101-07 (Bobbs-Merrill ed.
1965); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 1, at 24; H. PACKER, supra note 1, at 9.
5 See Developiments in the Law-Coriorate Crime, supfra note 2, at 1237 ("even when the activ-
ity proscribed by law is not in itself morally wrong, the knowing violation of the law may be
morally blameworthy').
6 See I. KANT, supra note 4, at 102.
7 See H. PACKER, supira note 1, at 11-12; Developments in the Law--Corporae Crime, supira
note 2, at 1233.
8 See Packer, MAens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 107, 109.
9 See H. PACKER, supira note 1, at 11-12; Develofpments in the Law-C--orporale Crime, supra
note 2, at 1236.
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When corporate entities entered the economic and judicial arenas
courts and legislatures considered it "fair" to subject corporations to
some of the same laws that individuals obeyed,' 0 but found it difficult
and were reluctant to apply criminal sanctions to corporations.I' A cor-
poration, as distinct from its board of directors and managers, is not a
person and has no "mind;" it cannot possess knowledge and intent, the
prerequisites to moral culpability.' 2 Some legislatures, however, recog-
nizing that criminal sanctions effectively deterred some undesirable cor-
porate activity, imposed a system of strict liability for certain corporate
offenses despite the inconsistency with retributive theory. 13
As corporations developed into the backbone of the United States'
economy, courts and legislatures attempted to inject two elements of re-
tributive theory-knowledge and intent-into the laws governing cor-
porations.14 An individual's intent is usually not distinguished from his
knowledge; if someone is aware of his own actions and their likely conse-
quences, it is logical to presume his intent to engage in the conduct and
cause its probable effects. 15 Finding intent in corporate activity and im-
puting knowledge to the corporation, both of the conduct and its likely
results, is more difficult than with an individual because corporations
lack definable "minds." 16 The law responded to these problems by
fictionalizing corporations into persons. The anthropomorphization of
the corporation transmuted the organizational entity into a "natural
person,"'17 and ostensibly facilitated the application of retributive theory
10 See, e.g., New York Central & H.R.R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909). See
also Friedman, Some Refections on the Corporation as Criminal Defendant, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW.
173, 178-79 (1979); Comment, Corporate CriminalLiability, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 870, 71 (1973).
11 See Commonwealth v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 339, 445
(1854) ("Corporations cannot be indicted for offenses which derive their criminality from evil
intention, or which consist in a violation of those social duties which appertain to men and
subjects."); Queen v. The Great North of England Ry. Co., 115 Eng. Rep. 1294, 1298 (Q.B.
1846) (Corporations could not be liable for perjury, felony, treason, or offenses against the
person because "[t]hese plainly derive their character from the corrupted mind of the person
committing them, and are violative of the social duties that belong to men and subjects."); C.
STONE, WHERE THE LAw ENDS 18-25 (1975); Friedman, supra note 10, at 179.
12 See generaly Friedman, supra note 10, at 179-82; Comment, supra note 10, at 873.
13 See Elkins, Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky. LJ. 73, 93-95
(1976).
14 See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) ("The contention that an
injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient
notion.'). See also United States v. U.S. Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422 (1978) (Sherman Act requires
intentional misconduct before a violation can be found); Securities Act of 1933, § 24, 15
U.S.C. § 77x (1976); National Labor Relations Act, § 12, 29 U.S.C. § 162 (1976). Seegenera l'y
Mathews & Sullivan, Criminal Liability for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: The National
Commission's Proposed Federal Crime Code, S 1, and S 1400, 11 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 883 (1973).
15 See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOrT, supra note 1, at 202-3.
16 See Friedman, supra note 10, at 180.
17 Id. at 173-80.
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of criminal law to it.
The anthropomorphization of corporations fails to solve the
problems associated with applying retributive theory to corporate con-
duct.18 Corporations remain "persons" only in legal fiction, not in real-
ity; they are economic entities which legal rules create and maintain.19
A corporation's board of directors and managers guide and control the
entity's economic movements and policies and perhaps are morally ac-
countable, 20 but the corporation itself, distinct from its board and man-
agers, cannot possess knowledge and intent or take voluntary actions.
Without these basic characteristics corporations cannot be immoral or
culpable and consequently there is no retributive justification for pun-
ishing them.2 1
Corporate criminal sanctions sprang from a moral notion that it
was fair to subject corporations to the same laws to which individuals
were subjected, but by the time the law recognized the discord between
retributive theory and corporate criminal sanctions the potential effi-
cacy of the sanctions as deterrents was embedded in the criminal justice
system.
This comment accepts the position that retributive theory is a
philosophically dissatisfying rationale for punishing corporations, 22 and
focuses on the remaining rationale, the consequentialist rationale, for
corporate criminal sanctions. Intuitively, it appears that criminal sanc-
tions deter some corporate offenses, but without a standard it is difficult
to determine how effectively criminal sanctions achieve the consequen-
tialist goal of reducing the level of corporate crime. Economic efficiency
serves as a gauge by which to measure the effectiveness of criminal sanc-
tions imposed by society on corporations for their misconduct. A system
of liability and enforcement that reduces the level of corporate miscon-
18 See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
19 "After all, the corporation itseif.., is apersonafrta, a 'legal fiction' with 'no pants to
kick or soul to damn."' C. STONE, supra note 11, at 3 (footnote omitted).
20 "[A]ll those who may be said to have directed or caused the actor to do the act, or to
have participated in accomplishing the result, may be treated as the actors." NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, I WORKING PAPERS 183
(1970).
21 'Theoretically, it is impossible for an artificial entity with no mind or soul to have mens
rea so as to incur moral guilt." Spurgeon & Fagan, Criminal Liabilityfor Life-Endangering Corpo-
rate Conduct, Symposium on the Policies and Legal Theories Underlying the Proposed Federal Criminal
Code, 72 J. CRIM. L. & C. 400, 424 (1981).
22 But see French, Types of Collectivitie. and Blame, 56 PERSONALIST 160, 166 (1975) (corpo-
rations "can be justifiably held blameworthy.. . .'); Gross, Organization S inwure and Organi-
zational Crime, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THEORY AND RESEARCH 52 (G. Geis & E.
Stotland eds. 1980) ("it is possible to assign responsibility for an organizational outcome to
the organization itself. . . ." Id. at 60); Developments in the Law--Corporate Crime, supra note 2,




duct as well as another system but costs society fewer resources is more
efficient and thus more effective in reducing corporate crime.23
The comment first examines the accuracy of a significant underly-
ing assumption of the consequentialist theory as applied to corporations:
corporations respond to threats of economic sanctions. Following the
examination of this assumption, the comment explores the costs differ-
ent systems impose on society and evaluates how effectively criminal
sanctions deter corporate misconduct.
III. CORPORATIONS AS CRIMINALS
Many of the consequentialist theory's rationales for criminal sanc-
tions do not apply to corporations; restraint, education and rehabilita-
tion of corporate violators are unnecessary, impractical, or nonsensical.
For example, when society seeks legal judgment against a corporation
for violating an antitrust law or for overpolluting, its purpose is not to
educate or rehabilitate the offender.24 Of the rationales that compose
the consequentialist theory of criminal sanctions, only deterrence is ap-
plicable to corporations; that is, according to consequentialist theory,
society imposes sanctions on corporations solely to deter potential
offenders.2 5
Consequentialist theory of criminal sanctions assumes a causal con-
nection between sanctions and deterrence. It assumes that threats of
fines or imprisonment alter potential offenders' conduct.2 6 The causal
relationship between punishment and deterrence in turn implies that
potential offenders make rational choices regarding their crimes, that
they weigh the advantages and disadvantages of committing offenses.
The accuracy of this consequentialist assumption of the rationality of
offenders' decisions as applied to corporations determines how effec-
tively fines, in general, can deter socially undesirable corporate activity.
Corporations are economic entities whose primary goal is to maxi-
mize profits.27 Those who run the daily affairs of corporations, corpo-
23 For a general definition of efficiency, see R. POSNER, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW
§ 1.2 (2d ed. 1977).
24 See generally K. ELzINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW
AND ECONOMICS 2-6 (1976); M. GREEN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 162 (1972).
25 See H. PACKER, supira note 1, at 356.
26 Bentham, an early consequentialist, writes: "The temptation may be said to be strong,
when the pleasure or advantage to be got from the crime is such as in the eyes of the offender
must appear great in comparison of the trouble and danger that appear to him to accompany
the enterprise. . . ." J. BENTHAM, An Introduction to the Pn'iles of Moral and Legislation, in
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 67 (ch. XI, § XL) (Bowring ed. 1843).
27 Developments in the Lau-Cororate Crne, supra note 2, at 1365. See also Riley, Taming
G ... and Ford, Union Carbide, U.S Steel, Dow Chemical... ,in WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME
207 (B. Wasserstein & M. Green eds. 1970).
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rate managers and executives, are experts at analyzing the costs and
benefits from different courses of conduct and choosing the most profita-
ble courses for the corporations. 2 If corporate profits lag or sink, new
managers may be installed either by the old shareholders or by new
shareholders, if the profit-sagging corporation is the target of a success-
ful take-over.29 Pressure to maximize profits can result in some corpo-
rate conduct that transgresses the law; executives may cause the
corporation to violate the law if the offense will maximize corporate
profits.30
A corporation run by rational profit maximizers will decide
whether to commit an offense depending on the difference between the
expected benefits of the offense to the corporation from the offense and
the expected costs of the offense.31 The expected benefits to a corpora-
tion are higher profits either from avoiding present or future costs or,
less typically, from increasing present or future revenues. The expected
costs of committing an offense include money and time spent in prepa-
ration and effectuation, the probability that offenders will be detected,
the probability that the corporations will be convicted, and the cost of
punishment.3 2 The cost of punishment comprises the severity of
corporate fines (the only sanction applicable to corporations) and any
damage from criminal stigmas. The expected cost to a potential corpo-
rate offender of committing an offense is equal to the product of the
probability that the government will impose a fine and the severity of
the fine.33
Because corporations are profit maximizers, fines for offenses can
effectively deter undesirable corporate activity. If the expected costs of
engaging in particular conduct increase sufficiently, corporate decision-
makers will reduce the frequency of the offenses they commit. The fact
that fines can effectively deter undesirable conduct implies nothing,
however, about efficient levels of fines or deterrence, or about the legal
28 Fischel, Eftient Capbital MarWt Theog, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of
Cash Tnder 0fers, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1978). Cf. C. STONE, su.pra note 11, at 38-50
("[T]here is a certain amount of economically nonrational behavior, especially in the calcula-
tion of legal threats, that stems from deeply rooted features in the organization itself." Id. at
43).
29 Fischel, supra note 28, at 2, 5-7.
30 C. MCCAGHY, DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: CRIME, CoNFLIar, AND INTERsr GRouPs 218
(1976); De/eoptenfr in the Law-Corporate Cne, supra note 2, at 1365.
31 For a study indicating criminal activity often is the result of rational calculations, see
Ehrilich, Padidation in Illegitimate Activities: An Economic Anayir, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOM-
0CS OF CRIME AND PuNisHMENT 68 (G. Becker & W. Landes eds. 1974).
32 The ability of corporations to benefit from an illegal act but still not be legally subject
to liability also affects the expected costs. For an extensive discussion of the "ease of evasion,"
see Dedop ments in the Lau-Corporate Crime, supira note 2, at 1243-57.
33 R. POSNER, supira note 23, at 165.
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mechanisms that impose fines. The following section presents a frame-
work for analyzing efficient fine and deterrence levels, and the relative
efficiencies of different systems for enforcing society's legal rules.
IV. AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK OF CORPORATE LIABILITY
If society's sole purpose were to deter all breaches of its legal rules,
society would employ millions of police and detection agents, and courts
would impose tremendous penalties for the smallest infractions. Al-
though few offenses would occur, society would spend much more to
prevent offenses than the offenses would cost society. Society would pay
more for a good, a very low offense rate, than the good would be worth
to society. An enforcement system that overdeters offenders is
inefficient.
An efficient enforcement system minimizes the total social cost of
offenses.34 Corporate offenses impose two social costs: the cost of reduc-
ing the number of offenses to a certain level, and the cost of enduring
the offenses at that level. Therefore, an efficient enforcement system
minimizes the cost of offense prevention and the cost that committed
offenses impose on society.
To understand the costs society incurs from imposing sanctions on
corporations, this section employs two versions of an economic model of
an efficient enforcement system. Version A of the model, a typical eco-
nomic approach to criminal sanctions, 35 minimizes the government's
cost of offense prevention without regard to the costs the government
imposes on corporations to comply with the laws. This section high-
lights and explains the inherent inefficiency in this type of liability sys-
tem as applied to corporations. Version B of the model corrects the
inefficiencies of Version A by expanding the cost of offense prevention to
include the costs fines impose on corporations. Version B states that the
social cost of an offense should determine the level of the fine society
imposes for an offense. Only when an offense's social cost determines the
corporation's expected cost can an enforcement mechanism be efficient.
VERSION A
In this version, the government, which is used to denote the control-
ler and administrator of the enforcement system, controls the short-run
determinants of society's corporate offense rate: the probability offenses
will be detected and the level of corporate fines. 36 The government indi-
34 See generally Becker, Crne and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcON. 169
(1968).
35 See generally id.
36 The model is more informative in economic terminology:
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rectly controls the probability that it will detect corporate offenses by
the number of detection agents it employs,3 7 while it directly controls
the level of fines. The government, by changing either of these deter-
rence variables, controls the level of corporate offenses, which in turn
determines the social cost of corporate violationsA8
The costs to the government of deterring corporate violations are
the cost of hiring detection agents who seek out and investigate possible
0 = go 0(D, F, V) (1)
where 0 is the number of corporate offenses committed within a geographical area such as
the United States; D, F and V are the probability of detection, the level of fines, and the
probability of conviction, respectively; go describes the functional relationship between the
variables and the number of offenses committed. Any increase in one of the variables reduces
the total number of offenses:
<0, -< 0, 0 <0.
aDOF ' V
The rational character of corporate decisionmakers supports these results. See supra note 31.80 0
To the extent that there is nondeterrable corporate offenses (e.g., 2 = 0 and - = 0), such
offenses are viewed as natural phenomena which this comment does not include in its analy-
sis. The exclusion is reasonable because the purpose of hiring detection agents and imposing
0 aoaufines is to deal with deterrable corporate activity (i.e., - < 0 and -F < 0). The model
assumes that corporate decisionmakers have knowledge of all three variables, including the
probabilities of detection and conviction. This assumption is not entirely realistic, but it is
not essential to the model and will be maintained for the purposes of analysis.
The rules governing corporate liability control the probability of conviction. The gov-
ernment must impose some liability system in order to deter corporate offenses and the model
assumes that all systems impose the same cost on society. This assumption is unrealistic if, for
example, one liability system imposes a much lower burden of proof than another system
imposes. This assumption is the subject of analysis in notes 84-90 & accompanying text infra.
The assumption is made for the purposes of this section and the model assumes that the
liability system is not a variable in the social cost of control function. Thus,
0 = go 0(D, F). (2)
37 That is,
D = go (A), with - > 0, (3)
8A
where A is the number of government detection agents employed, and gD describes the func-
tional relationship between the number of agents and the probability of detection. This func-
tion substituted into equation (2) produces the function:
0 = go (A, F). (4)
The number of government agents and the level of fines, both of which are controlled by the
government, determine the level of corporate offenses.
38 The cost of offenses to society depends upon the type of offenses committed. A transfer
of wealth by theft, for example, imposes a smaller cost on society than the destruction of the
same amount of property. Corporate offenses vary in nature from regulatory offenses to life-
endangering activity such as negligent constructions or designs. For the purposes of analysis,
the model assumes only one type of offense and thus assumes away the different social costs
different offenses impose. Generally, the social cost of corporate offenses is
CO =fo (0), with a o ° > 0, (5)
where Co is the total cost of offenses to society andfo describes the functional relationship
between the number of offenses and the social cost of offenses. The model also assumes that
1982]
COMMENTS [Vol. 73
offenses39 and the administrative costs associated with imposing, collect-
ing and distributing fines.40 Thus, the total cost to society of corporate
offenses is the sum of the cost of violations, the cost of detection agents
and the cost of administering fines. 4 1
the cost of corporate offenses to society is independent of the 4evel of offenses in society; that is,
it assumes the second derivative of equation (5) is zero.
Substituting the determinants of offenses (equation (4)) into the social cost of offenses
equation (5) produces
C0 = fo (A, F). (6)
The government's choice of the number of detection agents and the level of fine combine to
determine the social cost of corporate offenses.
39 The government's control of corporate offenses imposes costs on society just as offenses
impose costs on society. The cost of the government detection agents is
CA =fA(A), with - > 0, (7)
where CA is the cost to society of the detection agents;fA describes the functional relationship
between the number of detection agents and the cost of agents to society; and the greater the
number of detection. agents employed, the higher the cost of agents to society. Ignoring the
possibility that the detection agents will have strong unions, the model assumes the salary




40 The cost to society of imposing a fine is equal to the administrative costs associated with
collecting the fine and channelling it to the proper recipient(s) (for example, to the treasury or
the victims). Because the remainder, after these administrative costs, is basically a transfer
payment from one sector of society to another, Version A does not include the fines' absolute
values in determining the social cost of the fines. The number of offenses detected and the
level of the fines affect the administrative costs of fines in the model. Costs of collecting fines
are assumed to be constantly proportional though not equal to the magnitude of the fine and
thus increase with the number of detected offenses. Consequently, F denotes the administra-
tive costs of fines. But see Becker, supra note 34, at 190 (there is no social loss from fines). If
juries are more reluctant to render guilty verdicts as the magnitude of the fines increases, the
level of fines will affect the probability of convictions. The model assumes, however, that only
the number of detection agents affects the probability of conviction.
The cost of fines becomes 8 CF
CF =fF (A, F), with C > 0, (8)
where CF is the social cost of fines. Multiplying the probability that corporate offenses will be
detected by the total number of corporate offenses committed (0) yields the total number of
convictions, D0O. The total cost of administering sanctions to corporate offenders is the total
number of convictions multipled by the cost of administering each sanction. The form of
equation (8) can now be specified:
CF = DOF, (9)
where CF is the total social cost of administering corporate sanctions.
41 The total social cost of corporate offenses is the algebraic sum of the cost of violations,
C0 , the cost of corporate offense detection, CA, and the cost of administering the fines, CF:
= CO+CA + CF (10)
where CT is the total social cost of corporate offenses.
.0
Substituting equations (6)-(8), the total social cost of corporate offenses is depicted as a
function of its determinants:
Co - fo (A, F) +JA (A) + fF (A, F) (11)
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When the social cost of corporate offenses is minimized according
to Version A's assumptions,42 the model states that the government
42 To minimize the total social cost, the government determines the number of detection
agents and the level of corporate fines so as to minimize CT.
a CO = 0 (12)
OF OF OF
and
ac ~ L_ + 8c + -+- = (13)
a_ ao aA a o
Thus, the marginal increase in the social cost of corporate offenses resulting from lower
fines should equal the marginal savings, or benefit, of the lower fines. Equation (13) states
that the marginal cost of detection agents plus the marginal cost of administering fines caused
by an increase in detection agents should equal the marginal reduction in the cost of corpo-
rate offenses from the increased number of agents.
These basic conclusions reflect the notion that marginal benefits of an activity should
equal the marginal costs to maximize economic efficiency.
Substituting the specified cost equation, CF = .DOF, and the offense function, Co =fo
(0), into the total cost function C? i=fo (4, F) +fA (A) +fF (A, F), and then minimizing
total social cost produces more useful data concerning the social cost ofcorporate offenses and
their prevention:
0= a - ao -0 + D(F - + 0) (14)
OF 80O OF OF
and
C 0  8cr-ac 0 + CA + 8( . D8(0
8A ao aO aA DA aA
Since acoao (the marginal increase in the cost of offenses caused by a decrease in fines) is
aO
negative, F - + 0 must be positive for a solution to exist.9 C6 0
In equation (15), 8 0 - is the marginal decrease in the social cost of offenses caused by
8D 80
an increase in the number of detection agents. F(O2 + D-) is the effect that a change in
the number of detection agents has on the cost of administering fines. It is impossible to
determine, a /n'ii, the sign of the terms because of the mixed effects of an increase in the
number of detection agents: Hiring additional agents increases the probability of detection
and thus increases the cost of administering fines; but hiring additional agents also deters
some potential offenders and decreases the cost of administering fines. If an increase in con-
victions is the net effect, the sum of the two terms is negative and a marginal cost; if the sum
of the terms is positive, it is a marginal benefit.
Minimizing the social cost from corporate offenses and their prevention produces a corre-
sponding optimal corporate offense rate:
a~o ao80 -D(0- + ) (16)
and
aCo DCA 84A aD OA
o(D + 0a--- ). (17)
80 8A 80 A 80
These equations indicate that optimality is achieved when the marginal benefit of offense
prevention, a80 equals the marginal cost of offense prevention. Ste Becker, sufra note 34, at
180-81.
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should employ an optimum number of detection agents and impose
fines at an optimum level. The model also states that the government
should not set fines according to the damage corporate offenses cause,
but rather in proportion to the responsiveness, or elasticity, of offenses to
the fines. Corporate offenses that are responsive, or highly elastic, with
respect to fines should carry suitable penalties, but those offenses that
are not very responsive to fines should carry much lighter penalties.43 If
a fine will not alter the frequency of an offense, the costs of imposing the
penalty could outweigh any benefits from imposing the penalty.
Closer examination of Version A of the model exposes the ineffi-
ciency of a system for setting fines, and, as a result, the number of detec-
tion agents, without regard to the social damage the offenses impose. In
Version A, the government minimizes its costs of prevention and the
costs the remaining offenses impose. But, because fines are essentially
transfer payments from offenders to recipients, the cost of fines to society
in Version A is the cost of collecting and disbursing the money (i.e., the
transaction costs) 44
When the government minimizes total social cost under Version A,
it increases fines up to the point where the marginal administrative cost
to it from collecting and disbursing a higher fine equals the marginal
decrease in social cost of corporate offenses from the higher fines.4 5 The
level of a fine thus determined is unrelated to the damage that the of-
fense imposes on society.
Corporations' expected costs from committing offenses are directly
related to the level of the government's fines.4 6 Because the levels of
fines in Version A are unrelated to the social damage of the offenses, the
43 The final step involves articulating the elasticity of corporate offenses with respect to





a8o A o F(- 
-), (19)







where - - is the corporate offense elasticity with regard to detection; and - 0 is the
corporate offense elasticity with regard to fines.
44 See supra note 40.
45 See supra note 42.
46 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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expected costs to corporations of committing offenses are unrelated to
the social damage the offenses cause. When the government determines
a fine for a given offense, the fine may produce an expected cost to cor-
porations higher than, equal to, or lower than the offense's social dam-
age. When the government sets a fine for an offense that produces an
expected cost to potential corporate offenders significantly higher or
lower than the social cost of the offense, the government discourages
some value-maximizing (or cost-minimizing) corporate activities.47
For example, if Corporation XYZ has a choice of either committing
Offense 0, which imposes a total social cost of $100, or taking measures
to avoid Offense 0 at a cost of $1,000, XYZ should commit the offense.
IfXYZ spent $1,000 to avoid liability for an offense that damages society
$100, society-an aggregate of its members including XYZ-would in-
duce a $900 waste of its resources. A fine for Offense 0 that produces an
expected cost to XYZ greater than the offense's social damage economi-
cally encourages XYZ to spend more resources to avoid committing the
offense than the offense would damage society. When the expected cost
to corporations of committing a given offense is greater than the total
social damage from the offense, society actively discourages value-maxi-
mizing conduct and decreases society's total welfare.
Similarly, a fine that produces an expected cost to corporations less
than the social cost the offense imposes economically encourages corpo-
rations to commit offenses that are not'value- or welfare-maximizing. If,
in the example above, XYZ could avoid committing Offense 0 by
spending $50 but the expected cost of committing Offense 0 were only
$10, the fine would induce XYZ to commit the offense, even though the
$100 social cost is greater than the $50 cost of prevention. Thus, to max-
imize efficiency and total social welfare, the fine for breaching a legal
rule should produce an expected cost to the violator equal to the of-
fense's social damage.
VERSION B
Because the government in Version A of the model minimizes its
cost of crime prevention without regard to the costs it imposes on corpo-
rations to comply with the law, Version A is an inherently inefficient
system for deterring corporate offenses. The costs imposed upon society
as a whole by Version A outweigh the benefits stemming from the viola-
tions that the system deters. Version B provides a more efficient and
effective deterrence system by expanding the cost of offense prevention
to include compliance costs that fines impose on corporations.48
47 See generally Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970).
48 Version B is identical to Version A except that the total cost of crime is minimized
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Version B establishes expected costs to corporations at committing
offenses49 that equal the costs that the offenses impose on society plus the
social costs of substituting the court system for the market system where
appropriate.5 0 Thus, an efficient liability system requires that the actual
social costs of offenses rather than the government, determine the ex-
pected costs to corporations at committing offenses.5 1 In Version B, the
government minimizes total social costs of detection agents and fine ad-
ministration subject to the constraint that expected costs equal the social
costs of offenses.5 2
An enforcement system that sets expected costs to corporations
equal to the social costs of the offenses while minimizing detection costs
maximizes economic efficiency and deterrence effectiveness. An analysis
of an efficient, effective corporate deterrence system is incomplete, how-
ever, without an analysis of the relative efficiencies of different methods
for imposing expected costs on corporations. The following section ex-
amines three methods for enforcing legal rules and imposing efficient
levels of fines, or "levies,' 53 against corporations.
V. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
Three systems for enforcing economic sanctions against corpora-
tions for violating legal rules are criminal enforcement through public
prosecutors, civil enforcement through government agencies and civil
enforcement through private rights of action. A major relevant distinc-
subject to the constraintfr' C0 X , wherefis the fine levied for an offense with a social cost
of C, and D is the probability the fide will be imposed upon the offender. That is, minimize
CT = Co + CA + CF, subject tof= - , where F, the administrative cost of imposing a fine, is
a function off, the level of fine.
49 Recall that the expected cost of committing an offense is the product of the probability
that a sanction will be imposed and the severity of the sanction. Similarly, the fine imposed
equals the expected cost to a corporate offender divided by the probability the fine will be
imposed. That is, EC. "'fXp andf = E.C./p, where E. C is the expected cost,f is the fine
andp is the probability the fine will be imposed.
50 It should be noted that where there is a market in which the offender could have "bar-
gained" with its victim, an expected cost equal to the victim's damage will make the offender
indifferent between both methods of transactions and will not necessarily channel the transac-
tions into the market. Where there is a market, the expected cost to the offender should
include both the social cost of the offense and the cost of substituting the legal system for the
market. Where there is not a market in which the corporate offender could have bargained in
advance, however, the offender should not pay a market inducement component. Ste R.
POSNER, supra note 23, at 165-66.
51 The government would not have to set fines until corporations were convicted; the
government need only to convince potential offenders that the total fine or payout will equal
the offense's social damage escalated by the probability that payouts will occur.
52 See supra notes 36-43, 48.
53 When society extracts money from corporations for inflicting social costs and the ex-
tractions are directly proportional to the amount of the social damage inflicted, the extrac-
tions are perhaps more aptly termed "levies" than "fines."
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tion between these three enforcement methods, for the purposes of anal-
ysis, is that the first two are public forms of enforcement while the third
is a strictly private form.
Public and private enforcement of legal rules against corporations
share many of the same types of costs. Detection, litigation and collec-
tion costs are common to both. Although these forms of enforcement
share these same types of costs, the magnitudes of some costs differ de-
pending upon which sector, public or private, enforces the legal rules.
A. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
The cost of detection differs greatly for some corporate violations of
legal rules depending upon which sector enforces the rules. When a cor-
poration breaches an agreement with a private party, the "victim" de-
tects the breach at zero or minimal cost. When a defective product
causes injury to its buyer, the buyer/victim is likely to detect his injury
and to know the identity of the injurer; the victim's detection costs,
therefore, will be close to zero. If the public (the government) were the
exclusive "detector" of breaches of all rules, including those governing
contractual obligations and products liability, society would spend more
resources detecting some offenses, by hiring agents or compensating in-
formers, than it would cost individual victims to detect these offenses
themselves. When an enforcement system lowers its detection costs
while maintaining the same probability of detection and the same level
of deterrence, it becomes a more efficient and effective system.5 4 Thus,
for some legal rules governing corporate conduct, labelled for conven-
ience Group V rules,55 utilizing the victims of violations as the detection
agents would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of enforcement.5 6
If the victims of Group V breaches have litigation costs equdi to or
lower than the public's, the victims also should have to bring private
actions against corporate offenders. Requiring the victims to bring suits
themselves reduces the transaction costs associated with collecting and
transfering knowledge and evidence to third parties as well as transfer-
ing compensation, or levies, from corporations to victims.5 7 Private suits
by victims for Group V offenses eliminate the costs incurred when the
government acts as an intermediary.
54 See generaly R. POSNER, supra note 23, at § 1.2.
55 "V" is for victims in "Group V legal rules."
56 The victims of these offenses should be the sole detection agents if the marginal cost of
employing a public detection agent is greater than the marginal reduction in the social cost of
corporate crime caused by the-public agent, which is a plausible assumption.
57 The victims of corporate offenses must receive some compensation from the offender to
induce them to bring suits once they have detected the infractions. Compensating victims for
their injuries ensures that corporate offenders will be forced to pay the social cost of their
activities and serves as a further check that the activities will be value-maximizing.
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Two criteria define the class of legal rules the private enforcement
of which maximizes efficiency: The corporate offenses must have identi-
fiable victims, and must leave the victims aware of the violation and the
violator's identity. It is this high level of probability that their violation
will be detected that distinguishes the legal rules that are more effi-
ciently enforced by the private citizen from those that must be publicly
enforced to maximize efficiency.5 8
If corporations could escape liability by spreading the social costs of
their offenses across a broad group of victims, eliminating the economic
incentive for any one victim to bring suit, then corporations could im-
pose significant social costs without a safeguard or check to ensure that
the benefits of the cororation's activities are greater than their social
costs. 59 In cases where the costs of litigation outweigh each victim's eco-
nomic interest in obtaining redress from the offender, the class action
suit promotes economic efficiency. The class action suit, which aggre-
gates victims' damages, is a gap-filling mechanism for ensuring that the
offender pays for its damage, while providing victims with an economic
incentive to obtain compensation. 60
To achieve an efficient level of deterrence of corporate offenses, the
expected cost to corporations should equal the social cost from the of-
fenses. 61 For offenses with a probability of detection and conviction of
unity (p=l), the actual corporate levy should equal the social costs the
activities impose; that is, corporations should pay amounts equal to vic-
tims' damages.62 If the probability of either detection or conviction falls
below unity, the corporate levies must exceed the costs of the victims'
injuries. If the levies do not exceed the damages in this case, the ex-
pected costs to corporations-the products of the levies and the
probabilities of detection and conviction-will be less than the offenses'
social damages, and will induce corporations to breach rules (or not take
precautions) when social costs exceed benefits. 63
58 See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
59 See supra text accompanying and immediately subsequent to note 97.
60 For a discussion of some of the economic pitfalls of class action suits, see Rosenfield, An
Empirical Test of Class-Action Settlement, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 113 (1976).
61 See supra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
62 The expected cost of committing an offense (E. C.) is the probability a sanction will be
imposed (p) multiplied by the severity of the sanction 69: EC = p Xf. The efficiency-
maximizing levy is one that has an expected cost equal to the social cost of the offense (S. C).
The efficiency-maximizing fine, or levy, is thus,f= S.C/p. From this equation it is clear that
an offense with a very high probability that the offender will be forced to pay requires a levy
approximately equal to the social cost of the offense, which is the damage to the victims.
Assuming that a high percentage of detected offenses are redressed, the probability that an
offense will be detected can be substituted for the probability a sanction will be imposed.
63 For example, if the probability of detection and conviction for breaches is .50 and the
social cost of the offense is $100, the efficient levy, is $100/.50 or $200. If the levy is less than
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In cases where corporate levies exceed the victims' damages, the
allocation of the differential between the actual corporate levies and the
damages to the victims, whether it is deposited into a general fund or
goes as a windfall to the victims, is irrelevant. Requiring corporations to
pay the differential, not how the differential is allocated, is what affects
,the efficiency of the system.64
Private enforcement of Group V legal rules, those that have a
probability close to unity that victims will detect violations, produces
optimal efficiency and any public enforcement causes overdeterrence
and inefficiency. 65 If expected costs of corporate offenses do not equal
the social costs of the offenses, the expected costs can be increased. If the
expected costs of offenses equals their social damages, any additional
enforcement increases the probability of detection, which in turn in-
creases the corporations' expected costs above social costs. Expected
costs greater than social costs deter corporations from engaging in value-
maximizing conduct, conduct the total social benefits of which exceed
its costs. 66 The result is a move from efficiency to inefficiency and less
effective deterrence.
Private enforcement of some legal rules leads to economic effi-
ciency; private enforcement, however, is not an efficient mechanism for
enforcing all legal rules. Not all corporate transgressions of legal rules
produce knowing victims. 6
7
B. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT
Some corporate offenses have as their "victims" people unaware of
the injury or unaware of the breacher's identity. Public detection agents
must police violations of these legal rules-labelled for convenience
Group G rules68-to ensure efficiency. An example of a Group G of-
fense is a firm emitting carcinogenic effluence and effluvia. It is unlikely
that individuals in a nearby industrial town will know that the polluted
$200, the expected cost to the corporate offender is less than $100, the social cost of the of-
fense. Assume the levy is $150 and that to prevent the offense the corporation would have to
pay $80. The efficient solution is for the corporation to pay $80 to prevent the $100 social
cost. The expected cost to the corporation from committing the offense, however, is $75 ($150
X .50), which, being less than the cost of prevention, will induce the corporation to commit
the offense and pay the levy--an inefficient result.
64 Ifallocating the difference between the corporate levy and the victim's damage involves
a transaction cost, which is likely, then not permitting the victim to receive the "windfall"
could decrease efficiency.
65 This is based on the assumption that the marginal cost of increasing t$efine, or levy,
a is less than the marginal cost of employing a unit of public detection, ad "
66 Set .fifra text accompanying and immediately subsequent to note 47.
67 See t mpra note 58 and accompanying text.
68 "G" for government in "Group G legal rules."
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air is damaging them. Even if the townspeople detect the damage it is
unlikely that an individual would or could spend the resources needed
to single out the offending firm from surrounding nonoffending firms.
69
Because of the high expense for an individual to investigate the viola-
tion, the probability of private detection is low.
Because of the low probability that individual investigation will de-
tect breaches, efficient corporate levies for breaches of Group G legal
rules will exceed the total social damage from breaches. 70 Some com-
mentators suggest that to provide incentives for private enforcement of
all legal rules, including Group G type rules, enforcers could be re-
warded with the proceeds of a large fine. 7 1 Thus, it appears that enti-
tling private enforcers to the proceeds of efficiency maximizing levies
may create private incentives to detect corporate offenses, and create an
efficient system of private enforcement of all legal rules. 72
The defects of this type of private enforcement system, however,
reveal the need for public enforcement of Group G legal rules to maxi-
mize an enforcement system's efficiency and effectiveness. 73 Private en-
forcers, unlike the government, are profit maximizers whose goal is to
maximize the difference between their costs of detection and their reve-
nues from detection. The profit maximizing nature of private enforcers
creates inefficiency when the system relies upon them to police Group G
rules, legal rules with a low probability that breaches will be detected.
74
For example, if the amount of private resources devoted to detection of
corporate breaches of Group G rules is below the optimum level and the
levies or "rewards" are above the optimum level, the government's re-
duction of the rewards will not result in a move towards efficiency. Pri-
vate enforcers will not interpret the reduction in the rewards as a signal
to increase their levels of detection, for such an increase would not be
cost-justified. Rather, competition will force enforcers to spend less on
detection, and the result will be a lower, not the desired higher,
69 Although economic incentives could be provided to private detection agents, the result
would still be inefficient. See infra text accompanying notes 71-76.
70 See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
71 See Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 1 (1974).
72 For some breaches of Group V legal rules there is an economic gap between the high cost
to individuals of enforcing the legal rules and their relatively low return from enforcement.
Class action suits fill the gap by providing incentives and enhance efficiency. For some
breaches of Group G legal rules there is a similar gap: It is prohibitively expensive for indi-
viduals to detect breaches or breachers compared to the low return from their detection.
Rewarding private enforcers with efficient fines may be a method to fill the economic gap.
73 Landes & Posner, The thvate Enforcement ofLaw, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 30-33 (1975).
74 Id. at 3-16.
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probability of detection; this is a move away from efficiency. 75
Public enforcement of legal rules where the probability of detection
is significantly below one does not lead to inefficient levels of expendi-
tures on detection because the government does not have to act as a
private profit maximizer. The government as public enforcer is not con-
strained to interpret the reduction in levies as a signal to decrease detec-
tion expenditures. Instead, the public enforcer can appropriately
respond by increasing its resources devoted to detection of corporate
breaches of these legal rules. The result is a move towards efficiency. 76
This analysis indicates that private enforcement of legal rules where
the probability of detection is close to unity and public enforcement of
those rules where the probability of detection is significantly less than
unity maximizes the economic efficiency and effectiveness of a corporate
deterrence system. The following section examines the most efficient
form of public enforcement of Group G legal rules.
C. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT: CIVIL VERSUS CRIMINAL LEVIES
Public enforcement of Group G legal rules to deter corporate of-
fenses can take the form of either criminal or civil procedures and liabil-
ity. Because the government cannot imprison corporations, monetary
levies are the only sanctions available to deter undesirable corporate
conduct. 77 Civil and criminal levies may appear to be economically in-
distinguishable: both involve charges to corporate treasuries and should
be equally severe for a given offense. 78 Two major differences between
civil and criminal levies, however, affect the effectiveness of enforcement
systems.
7 9
First, a system of criminal levies may be 'cheaper' than a civil sys-
tem. Although most commentators reject the theory,80 some commenta-
75 For additional and more detailed critical analysis of private enforcement of all legal
rules, see Landes & Posner, supra note 73, at 1-33.
76 Landes & Posner, sufra note 73, at 1-15.
77 Corporate managers and directors could be jailed for their illegal actions, see Develop-
ments in the Law--Corporalte Crime, supra note 2, at 1259-1275, but this comment deals only with
holding corporations qua corporations criminally liable.
78 See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
79 Although it is cheaper to meet a "preponderance of the evidence" standard than a
"beyond reasonable doubt" standard, using this as a basis for endorsing civil corporate sanc-
tions would render the criminal standard of proof less efficient in all cases-an economically
indefensible position. See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
80 See H. PACKER, supra note 1, at 361; Developments in the Law--Corporate Crime, sufpra note
2, at 1366.
Coffee highlights six potential problems inherent in a strategy of deterring corporate
conduct through adverse publicity: the government is a poor propagandist; government pub-
licity may be "drowned out" by the current flood of criticisms of corporations; corporations
can mitigate bad press with "counter-publicty"; the effect of adverse publicity from a regula-
tory violation is dubious; adverse publicity is a "loose-canon," the effect of which is "wholly
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tors81 suggest that criminal convictions may impose "stigmas" on
convicted corporations in the form of social distrust. A corporation con-
victed of a crime may experience reduced sales and lower profits. If
criminal labels produced subsequent monetary losses to corporations,
the accompanying levies would need to be correspondingly lower than
civil levies to avoid overdeterrence.
Society should reflect the additional monetary losses resulting from
criminal stigmas in lower levies, thus producing expected costs from vio-
lating Group G legal rules equal to the offenses' social costs. The gov-
ernment could use the criminal stigma to save the administrative costs
of imposing higher, civil levies. A system of criminal levies, according to
this argument, would produce the same level of deterrence as a civil
system but would save society part of the cost of administering levies,
and thus would be more efficient than a civil system.
The analysis is incomplete, however, without an examination of the
costs of such a criminal levy system. To impose efficiency-maximizing
expected costs, the government would have to spend additional re-
sources to measure the monetary penalty a criminal stigma would im-
pose on a convicted corporation. A corporation's sales fluctuate in
response to countless variables, and the government would have to weed
through sales and income data to determine, ex ante, a criminal convic-
tion's profit effect. Such a determination would impose a potentially
large cost on the criminal system.8 2
Assuming that the resources the government would save in levy ad-
minstration costs were greater than those it would spend to determine
the effect of the stigmas on corporations' profits, the criminal stigma
would have decreasing marginal benefits to the government. As courts
convicted corporations of criminal offenses, the criminal label would
have decreasing and, eventually, no impact on a corporation's future
profits. As criminal levies became more common and their profit effect
decreased, courts would have to increase levies to maintain the appro-
priate expected costs to corporations. 8 3
unpredictable"; and several civil liberties issues surround the use of adverse publicity as a
sanction. Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick'" An Unscandalizednqu7 Into the Problem of
Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 425-29 (1981).
81 See, e.g., M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 29-31, 318-322 (1980); Fisse,
The Use of tbli ity as a Criminal Sanction Against Business Corporations, MELB. U. L. REV. 107
(1971).
82 The government would not have to forecast the profit effect of a conviction for each
corporate offense on each corporation until conviction. To avoid the calculation, the govern-
ment need only to convince potential offenders that the total monetary payout, fine and
stigma effect, will equal the offenses' social costs escalated by the probability that payouts will
occur.
83 Some commentators "demonstrate" the stigma effect of corporate convictions by hast-
ily drawing inferences from a corporation's activities. For example, two commentators cite
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At the point where the criminal label's profit effect was zero the
criminal levy would equal the civil levy for a given offense because the
initial rationale for imposing a reduced levy-the criminal label's pen-
alty to profits-would no longer exist. According to this analysis, crimi-
nal levies for Group G offenses are no more efficient than civil levies, but
arguably are no less efficient.
The second major difference between public civil and criminal sys-
tems of enforcement is the level of procedural protection each system
provides corporate defendants. In particular, the criminal system pro-
vides the corporate defendant the procedural advantage that its oppo-
nent, the prosecutor, must prove the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The economic argument against the reasonable
doubt standard, and thus against criminal levies on corporations
charged with violating a legal rule, is premised upon the cost of an erro-
neous determination of a corporation's responsibility.84
In typical criminal cases, where the defendant faces a prison term
and/or disparagement of his reputation, the only benefit to society from
his conviction is the deterrent effect; there is not a transfer payment such
as there is with levies. When a court convicts an innocent defendant of a
criminal offense, that is, when it makes an error in determining responsi-
bility, the deterrent effect of the conviction is negative:85 it decreases po-
tential offenders' expected punishment costs by narrowing the gap
between the cost of engaging in lawful conduct and of engaging in un-
lawful conduct. 86
The net social cost of convicting an innocent defendant is the cost
of the sanction to the defendant and the social cost of increased criminal
the following example: "[S]eeking to avoid conviction for reckless homicide for the Pinto
deaths of three girls, Ford Motor Company spent in litigation expenses an estimated one
million dollars to escape a possible $30,000 penalty." According to these commentators, this
example proves that, "[a]s with individuals, the social opprobrium attached to a criminal
conviction acts as a deterrent for corporations." Spurgeon & Fagan, sufira note 21, at 426
(footnote omitted). Ford officials, on the other hand, justified the expense in this way:
"[C]onviction . . . would doubtless facilitate any civil actions brought against Ford by the
victims' relatives;" and, according to a criminal investigator for the prosecutor in the Pinto
case, a conviction in the Pinto case would lead to the "next logical step . . . to go after
individual executives." INDusTRY WEEK, Feb. 19, 1979, at 24. Thus, it is at least arguable
that additional litigation costs that a criminal conviction would produce, and not a stigma
from conviction, justified Ford's litigation costs.
84 See R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 430-34.
85 Id. at 434.
86 Posner provides an example of this effect with regard to vaguely drawn statutes, but the
analysis is applicable here: "[1]f the expected punishment cost for people who steal is 10, but
people who don't steal face an expected punishment cost of 3 because of the vagueness of the
theft statute, the effective expected cost for theft is only 7." Id. at 424-25 n.3. If the words,




conduct as a result of the reduced net expected punishment costs. The
net social cost of acquitting a guilty defendant is the social cost of an
increase in crime from the decrease in the probability of conviction.8 7
Acquitting one guilty defendant in a typical criminal case probably
will not produce a significant increase in crime; therefore, several acquit-
tals of guilty defendants are required to equal the social cost of one erro-
neous conviction.88 Thus, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in cases involving prison terms and/or disparagements of reputa-
tion is economically sound.
The costs of an erroneous determination of a corporation's responsi-
bility are different from those involved in typical criminal cases. When
a corporation must compensate society for damage it inflicts, society's
benefit from a verdict against the corporation equals the amount of
compensation. The net social cost of a court's finding against a
nonresponsible corporation, the difference between the cost to the de-
fendant-the levy-and the benefit to the government-plaintiff-the
levy-is minimal (allowing for transaction costs). The net social cost of
a court's finding in favor of a responsible corporation, the difference be-
tween the defendant's benefit and the government-plaintiff's loss-
again, the levy-is minimal.
Thus, unless an assumption is made with respect to the marginal
utility schedules of responsible defendants who escape liability and
nonresponsible defendants who incur liability,8 9 economics dictates a
burden of proof such that of the cases erroneously decided, half will be
in favor of nonresponsible defendants and half in favor of responsible
defendants. The civil standard that the government-plaintiff prove the
defendant's responsibility by a preponderance of the evidence-by a
probability incrementally greater than fifty percent-is such a burden of
proof.90 For corporate conduct that does not produce victims who are
aware of their injuries, or Group G offenses, government civil, not crimi-
nal, proceedings maximize economic efficiency.
Many commentators have also reached the conclusion that the gov-
ernment should not impose criminal sanctions for corporate activity in
violation of legal rules by methods of analyses other than efficiency max-
imization. For example, commentators have argued against criminal le-
vies and proceedings based on: the discord of corporate criminal
87 Id. at 434.
88 Id.
89 Because money is often assumed to be a good with decreasing marginal utility--a given
individual's first dollar is more valuable to him than his last dollar--the defendant who must
pay although innocent arguably experiences a greater loss in his utility than the guilty de-
fendant who escapes liability. Id. at 432.
90 R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 432.
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liability with the requirements that criminals have intent and
knowledge of their actions;9' the dubious applicability of constitutional
protections to corporations; 92 the failure of corporate criminal liability
to comport with the consequentialist and retributive rationales for crimi-
nal sanctions;93 the ineffectiveness of the criminal stigma as a deterrent
to corporate activities; 94 the empirical ineffectiveness of criminal sanc-
tions in deterring corporate conduct, in general;95 the unfairness of the
arbitrary criminal attachment to corporations where the government
can pursue either civil or criminal procedures against a corporation; 96
and the unfairness of both criminal and civil liability for the same eco-
nomic social injury.97
VI. CONCLUSION
An enforcement system maximizes total social welfare when it em-
ploys two different mechanisms for two different types of corporate of-
fenses. The private sector should enforce legal rules where the
probability that victims will detect corporate violations is close to unity;
the public sector should enforce rules where the probability of detection
is significantly below unity by means of civil, not criminal, proceedings
and levies.
The monetary levies for breaches under both private and public
systems should produce expected costs to potential corporate violators
equal to the social damage of the offenses. When social damage deter-
mines the expected costs to corporations from violating society's legal
rules, private and public-civil enforcement of the rules exploits the ra-
tional nature of corporate decisions, and minimizes the total social costs
of corporate offenses.
JOHN T. BYAM
91 See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, I
WORKING PAPERS 184 (1970); Friedman, supra note 10, at 173, 180, 184; Mueller, Menrteaand
the Corporation, 19 U. Prrr. L. REv. 21, 23 (1957).
92 See, e.g., Brosnahan, Miller & Foy, Corporate Crminal Liability, 26 PRAc. L. 23, 29-30, 32-
35 (1980); Friedman, supra note 10, at 188-91, 195-201; Developments in the Law--Corporate
Crime, supra note 2, at 1276-89.
93 See, e.g., Developiments in the Law-Cororate Crime, supra note 2, at 1236-37, 1262, 1303-06.
94 See, e.g., H. PACKER, supra note 1, at 361; Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and.Attitudes
Toward Risk" An Economic Analysis, 86 HARv. L. REv. 693, 697 (1973); Kadish, Some Observa-
tions on the Use of CriminalSanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 423,434
(1963).
95 See, e.g., M. GREEN, supra note 24, at 162; Kadish, supra note 94, at 435.
96 See, e.g., Develofments in the Law--Corporate Crime, supra note 2, at 1301-06.
97 See, e.g., Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Fofeitures: A Framework for Constitutional
Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379 (1976); Friedman, supra note 10, at 195-97; Developments in the
Law-Cororate Crime, sura note 2, at 1300-51.
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